

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00
CIAE-00 ACDE-00 /026 W
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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8022
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION USNATO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 05100

EXDIS

USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR EARLE'S STATEMENT OF APRIL 5, 1978
(SALT TWO-1677)

1. THE FOLLOWING IS STATEMENT DELIVERED BY AMBASSADOR
EARLE AT SALT TWO MEETING OF APRIL 5, 1978:

- STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR EARLE
- APRIL 5, 1978

MR. MINISTER:

- I

TODAY I WILL ADDRESS THE BAN ON THE FLIGHT-TESTING
AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF ICBMS IN ARTICLE II OF THE
PROTOCOL. THE TWO SIDES HAVE AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE
SUCH A BAN FOR THE PROTOCOL PERIOD, BUT HAVE NOT AGREED ON
A DEFINITION OF THE TERM "NEW TYPES OF ICBMS."

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THE SOVIET SIDE HAS PROPOSED AN EXEMPTION FOR ONE
NEW TYPE OF ICBM EQUIPPED WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE.
THE UNITED STATES FINDS THIS EXEMPTION INCONSISTENT WITH
THE PURPOSE OF ARTICLE II OF THE PROTOCOL AND CANNOT
ACCEPT THIS SOVIET PROPOSAL. I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS IN
FURTHER DETAIL THE BASIS FOR THIS POSITION OF THE

UNITED STATES.

- II

IN ITS STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 23, THE SOVIET DELEGATION STATED THAT "DEVELOPMENT OF ONE NEW TYPE OF ICBM WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE IS DICTATED FOR THE SOVIET UNION BY THE NEED TO REPLACE AGING ICBMS WITH SUCH REENTRY VEHICLES, SINCE THEIR REPLACEMENT, PLANNED EARLIER, BY RS-16 AND RS-18 TYPE MISSILES WITH SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLES CANNOT BE CARRIED OUT BECAUSE, CONTINGENT UPON REACHING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION FOR CRUISE MISSILES, THESE TYPES OF MISSILES WILL BE COUNTED AS DELIVERY VEHICLES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS." IN FACT, HOWEVER, THE SOVIET UNION HAS NON-MIRVED ICBMS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED IN RECENT YEARS. FOR EXAMPLE, TWO MODIFIED VERSIONS OF THE SOVIET ICBM WHICH THE UNITED STATES REFERS TO AS THE SS-11 WERE FIRST DEPLOYED IN 1973, ONE VERSION WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE AND THE OTHER WITH THREE REENTRY VEHICLES. THESE ICBM VERSIONS BOTH HAVE IMPROVED CAPABILITIES IN COMPARISON WITH THE OLDER VERSION OF THE SS-11 AND CAN HARDLY BE DESCRIBED AS "AGING."

IN ANY EVENT, THE SOVIET ARGUMENT THAT THERE IS A NEED TO REPLACE SUCH "AGING" ICBMS DURING THE PERIOD OF THE PROTOCOL IS NOT PERSUASIVE. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE
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EXPRESSED NEED TO REPLACE THESE ICBMS WITH A NEW TYPE OF ICBM EQUIPPED WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE DURING THE PROTOCOL PERIOD CAN BE INTERPRETED IN SEVERAL WAYS. ONE INTERPRETATION WOULD BE THAT THE INDIVIDUAL MISSILES THEMSELVES ARE AGING AND NEED TO BE REPLACED. IN THAT CASE, THE SOLUTION WOULD BE SIMPLE, NAMELY, TO REPLACE THEM WITH MISSILES OF THE SAME TYPE. SUCH REPLACEMENT WOULD NOT BE PROHIBITED UNDER THE PROPOSAL OF EITHER SIDE. ANOTHER INTERPRETATION WOULD BE THAT IT IS THE TECHNOLOGY USED IN EXISTING NON-MIRVED ICBMS WHICH IS AGING. IN THAT CASE, IT COULD BE INFERRED THAT THE PROPOSED EXEMPTION WOULD PERMIT THE REPLACEMENT OF SUCH EXISTING TYPES OF ICBMS WITH A NEW TYPE OF ICBM BASED ON MORE MODERN TECHNOLOGY WITH INCREASED CAPABILITIES. THIS WOULD RAISE THE QUESTION AS TO WHY THE SOVIET UNION SEES THE NEED FOR SUCH A NEW IMPROVED SYSTEM.

IF THERE WERE SUCH AN EXEMPTION, A SIDE COULD FLIGHT-TEST AND DEPLOY A NEW TYPE OF ICBM EQUIPPED WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE WHICH HAD A THROW-WEIGHT SEVERAL TIMES THAT OF EXISTING NON-MIRVED ICBMS WITH A CORRESPONDING INCREASE IN LAUNCH-WEIGHT. THE COMBINATION OF IMPROVED

MISSILE ACCURACY AND INCREASED NUCLEAR WARHEAD YIELD
RESULTING FROM THE INCREASED THROW-WEIGHT OF SUCH A NEW
TYPE OF ICBM COULD GIVE IT THE CAPABILITY TO ATTACK
EFFECTIVELY THE ICBM SILOS OF THE OTHER SIDE. THUS, THE
NET EFFECT OF SUCH A NEW TYPE OF ICBM WOULD BE TO ADD A
DESTABILIZING ELEMENT TO THE STRATEGIC SITUATION. IN THE
VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES, IT IS THE AIM OF ARTICLE II OF
THE PROTOCOL TO FREEZE ICBM CAPABILITIES AT THEIR CURRENT
LEVEL FOR THE PROTOCOL PERIOD IN ORDER TO AVOID SUCH

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DESTABILIZING DEVELOPMENTS AND THUS TO ENHANCE STRATEGIC
STABILITY.

MOREOVER, IMPROVEMENTS, ESPECIALLY THOSE ASSOCIATED
WITH ICBM ACCURACY, DEVELOPED IN CONNECTION WITH A NEW
TYPE OF ICBM EQUIPPED WITH A SINGLE REENTRY VEHICLE,
COULD SUBSEQUENTLY BE TRANSFERRED TO OTHER ICBMS INCLUDING
THOSE EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS. SUCH A CONSEQUENCE WOULD ALSO
BE DESTABILIZING AND WOULD BE COUNTER TO THE GOAL OF
ENHANCED STRATEGIC STABILITY.

- III

MEASURES WHICH MAINTAIN OR ENHANCE THE SURVIVABILITY
OF THOSE FORCES WHICH CONTRIBUTE TO THE STRATEGIC BALANCE
BETWEEN THE SIDES ARE A CENTRAL OBJECTIVE IN THE LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC ARMS. LIMITATIONS ON ICBM CAPABILITIES WOULD

BE SUCH A MEASURE. AS THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION HAS
EMPHASIZED ON MANY OCCASIONS, ICBMS ARE THE MOST
DESTABILIZING ELEMENT IN THE STRATEGIC BALANCE. THIS
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RESULTS FROM THEIR RELATIVELY LARGE THROW-WEIGHT, HIGH
ACCURACY, HIGH STATE OF READINESS, SHORT FLIGHT TIME, AND
POTENTIAL VULNERABILITY.

- IV

MR. MINISTER, AGREEMENT TO THE PROPOSAL OF THE
UNITED STATES TO BAN ALL NEW TYPES OF ICBMS DURING THE
PROTOCOL PERIOD WOULD SERVE THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF
BOTH OUR NATIONS. EARLE

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